

NSC BRIEFING

6 February 1957

CHOU EN-LAI'S TOUR

- I. This week, with his departure from Ceylon, Chou En-lai finally ended his interrupted grand tour of Asia (begun 17 Nov '56). The break in Chou's procession came at year's end, when he hurried back to Peiping for a two-week swing through the USSR, Poland and Hungary in the role of emergency "honest broker" in Bloc affairs.
 - A. The top brass who turned out at Moscow airport (7 Jan) to meet Chou (including Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Sheipilov, Malenkov and Saburov among others) testifies to the importance the USSR places on China's support.
 1. Chou certainly reported to the Soviet leaders on the unsympathetic Asian reaction he had encountered regarding intervention in Hungary. He may well also have encouraged Soviet toleration of Poland's newly-won special position.
 2. At the same time, it may be assumed that he reassured the Soviet leaders of Peiping's dedication to the principle of Bloc solidarity under the primacy of the USSR.
 - B. In Poland (11 to 16 Jan), Chou's apparent goal was to persuade Gomulka of the overriding importance of Bloc unity.
 1. He evidently convinced the Poles that Peiping sympathized with Warsaw and respected Gomulka's reservations on some points of Soviet policy (such as Hungarian intervention).
 2. He persuaded Gomulka that it was in China's interest--

and presumably Poland's--to maintain essential elements of Bloc unity and to endorse "proletarian internationalism."

C. His one-day visit to Budapest, by contrast, was merely pro forma.

1. Visit may have been made in accordance with Chou's promise to Nehru to examine the situation in Hungary.
2. But Peiping was already committed to support the USSR on Hungary, and Chou made no honest effort to explore the issues.

D. Chou's emergency detour through the Satellites makes it clear that Peiping sympathizes with these Eastern European states but still regards the Sino-Soviet alliance as the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy.

1. This position was made clear in the joint communique from Moscow (18 Jan) which warned that an attempt by any state to leave the Bloc would be met with military intervention.

II. Returning to his interrupted Asian itinerary on 19 Jan, Chou called in Afghanistan, India (for the third and fourth time), Nepal and Ceylon. Chou met his principal disappointment in India, the only country of the 8 in Asia he visited where he failed to get a joint communique.

A. Analysis of his joint communiqes in other countries shows that Chou was glad to settle for innocuous documents which set forth agreement on platitudes and avoided differences.

B. In Chou's final meeting with Nehru, however, the atmosphere was cool.

1. Nehru rejected Chou's justification for Soviet intervention in Hungary.

2. Nehru was defensive of US foreign policy.
 3. Nehru was probably miffed at Chou's unwillingness to give full endorsement to the Indian position on Kashmir (while stating to the press that he condemned the UN resolution, Chou asked for negotiations on Kashmir between India and Pakistan).
 4. With Chou unwilling to include Sino-Indian differences in a communique and Nehru unwilling to settle for platitudes alone, no document was forthcoming.
- C. In the battle of communiqes, Chou scored most heavily in Ceylon (31 Jan-5 Feb).
1. Premier Bandaranaike signed a joint document which echoed Communist propaganda ridiculing the concept of a power vacuum in the Middle East.
 2. The Ceylon communique also called for an end to nuclear weapon tests and for a second Afro-Asian conference (both themes heavily played in Moscow and Peiping propaganda).
- D. Chou was courteously received elsewhere in Asia (he had visited ^{North} Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma and Pakistan before the Moscow detour) but failed for the most part to come off with his usual shining honors.
1. The communiqes from Pakistan and Afghanistan, for example, ^{only} dealt ~~in~~ in generalities affirming the dedication of all parties to the cause of peace.
 2. In Burma, Chou was unable to allay fully the effect of a bad press on the Sino-Burmese border controversy.

III. On balance, Chou's Asian procession was only a moderate success. He never quite overcame the damage to his public relations effort caused by the Soviet action in Hungary.

A. Chou tried to smooth over matters by repeated assurances of Chinese opposition to "great nation chauvinism."

B. But he found it necessary to become increasingly defensive of the USSR.

1. At a press interview at the Chinese embassy in Karachi in late Dec, he became enraged at one reporter for his goading questions on Hungary, had to be led away.

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2.

3. Chou also blew up in Colombo, under press questioning on US prisoner issue. Flushed and angry, he burst out: "Why should we always have to listen to the words of the president of the US? The US doesn't recognize China...it is hostile to China. Let the US continue not to recognize us for ten, 100 or even 1,000 years. China will not topple. Maybe she will stand on her feet even more firmly."

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MSC BRIEFING

CHOU EN-LAI'S TOUR

- I. This week Chou ended grand tour, highlighted by visit to USSR, Poland
- A. Soviet topmost brass turned out to receive Chou
 - 1. He reported unsympathetic Asian reaction on Hungary
 - 2. Reassured Russians that Peiping dedicated to bloc solidarity
 - B. Convinced Poles of Peiping's sympathy, persuaded them to endorse "proletarian internationalism"
 - C. Made only pro forma visit to Budapest
 - D. Soviet alliance still cornerstone Peiping's foreign policy
- II. Chou met principal disappointment in India, where he got no communique
- A. Would have been glad to settle for innocuous document
 - B. Atmosphere at final meeting with Nehru cool
 - C. Chou scored most heavily in Ceylon, getting communique which echoed some points of Communist propaganda
 - D. Courteously received elsewhere, but did not come off with usual shining honors
- III. Chou never quite overcame setback caused by Hungarian news
- A. Tried to smooth matters by criticizing "great nation chauvinism"
 - B. But finally blew up at reporters' goading questions

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